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ABSTRACT
Agency theory suggests that gainsharing produces changes in monitoring within teams,
however, the implications of monitoring on individual behavior have not yet been examined.
This research expands agency theory by exploring the behavioral implications of peer
monitoring under gainsharing. Performance data from both individual workers and managers
show that peer monitoring has either zero or positive effects on five categories of individual
behavior.  However, focus group, interview, and company generated survey data indicate the
existence of concealment and perhaps retaliatory behaviors in response to gainsharing.
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INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF MONITORING
UNDER GAINSHARING: EXPANDING AGENCY THEORY PREDICTIONS.
Gainsharing plans, and a number of variants based on gainsharing concepts, are being
implemented at an increasing rate (Iberman, 1993; Lawler & Cohen, 1992; Markham, Scott &
Little, 1992).  These programs, which develop group-based incentives for a plant, division, or
department, are being hailed for their ability to increase productivity, reduce costs, enhance
morale, improve quality, and complement new forms of organization design (Welbourne &
Gomez-Mejia, 1995).  Gainsharing plans were first derived to assure that a company could take
advantage of the hidden knowledge of its workforce (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1988).
Joseph Scanlon, viewed as the founder of gainsharing, was convinced that workers held the key
to increased productivity (Graham-Moore & Ross, 1990).  His early successes in using bonus
plans and suggestion committees to solicit employee suggestions and enhance cooperation led
to the increased interest in gainsharing programs that continues today.
Although gainsharing plans are gaining in popularity, the theoretical work associated
with these plans has been fairly limited (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1993).  Recently, however, Joseph
Scanlon’s early assumptions that gainsharing plans can tap information from the workforce have
been supported by agency theory concepts demonstrating that gainsharing results in increased
monitoring behaviors among work teams (Welbourne, Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1995).  The
research reported in this paper further explores agency theory implications by studying ways in
which monitoring (both within and between work teams) affects individual employee
performance.  In addition to suggesting that levels of monitoring change under gainsharing-type
incentives, agency theory also states the possibility of negative consequences on individual
behavior.  Therefore, this research, which is somewhat exploratory in nature, was designed to
further understand the implications of monitoring on individual work-based outcomes in a
gainsharing environment.
AGENCY THEORY AND MONITORING
Agency theory has been used by researchers to understand how various forms of
control can be implemented to enhance firm performance.  The theory deals with the general
situation where agents (employees) are hired by principals (or owners) who devise a variety of
methods (monitoring, incentive alignment, procedures, etc.) to control the behavior of those
agents.  Control is necessary to assure that agents do not pursue individual goals that might be
inconsistent with the objectives of the owner.  The effectiveness of these various control options
has been studied primarily in the context of the CEO / owner relationship (Gomez-Mejia, 1994).
However, the problems of delegation and development of mechanisms to align the interests of
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agents with those of the principal have recently been extended to other jobs such as sales
(Anderson & Oliver, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1985), university faculty (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992),
and plant level employees (Welbourne et al., 1995).
The plant level study viewed the agency problem as one that could be applied to a
situation where multiple individuals, as a whole, constituted the agent.  In that study, the
principal was considered to be top management at the plant, and the agents were viewed as all
employees covered by a gainsharing program.  The Welbourne et al. study suggested, based
on the classical writings of agency theory (e.g. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling,
1976; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983), that “mutual monitoring should result when agents
pursue their self interest through the accomplishment of joint tasks with other agents and are
evaluated and rewarded on the basis of the outcome of those collaborative efforts” (1995: 883).
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that mutual monitoring allows principals to indirectly access
information not normally available to them.  Monitoring is basically an information seeking
activity that is enhanced when employees begin to scan a larger environment.  In a gainsharing
system, employees earn a bonus when the joint actions of all employees in the plant or division
work together to attain the goals specified in the gainsharing plan.  This interdependence,
particularly at a broader level (not only within a team but also between teams), encourages
information gathering from multiple sources.
Welbourne et al. (1995) investigated the degree to which monitoring behaviors were
conducted within a work team in a gainsharing environment.  Monitoring was defined as
including both information gathering and response behaviors.  By contrast, this study only deals
with the information gathering component of monitoring.  However, it expands the Welbourne et
al. (1995) study in that it investigates monitoring within and between teams and then considers
the effects of both forms of monitoring on multiple categories of individual work-related behavior.
Whereas the earlier study of gainsharing and monitoring explored the antecedents of monitoring
behaviors, the research described in this paper considers individual behavioral consequences of
peer monitoring in a gainsharing context.
BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF MONITORING
Agency theory can be used to hypothesize that monitoring will increase in gainsharing
environments, however, the degree to which or the way in which monitoring affects individual
performance levels has not been fully specified.  In fact, agency theory provides conflicting
hypotheses regarding the effect of monitoring on employee behaviors.  Overall, peer monitoring
is cast as something that should result in positive outcomes for the organization, however, there
seems to be a “black box” that assumes monitoring will lead to improved individual behaviors in
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order to attain organizational outcomes.  Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the advantages of
monitoring in partnerships (such as exists in legal and accounting firms) where all members
share the risk as well as the gains of business.  By working together, often in formal teams, the
flow of information is enhanced, and workers engage in peer monitoring to assure that everyone
is attaining the goals of the organization.  This concept has recently been applied to
gainsharing.  As noted by Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia,
“Gainsharing plans substitute a different (and less costly) form of control for
direct supervision.  It is expected that within and between teams, gainsharing
plans encourage stronger levels of peer group pressure to enforce work norms
consistent with the business unit goals...  Rather than expending resources to
create surveillance systems that attempt to track employee performance and
behaviors, the firm encourages employees to monitor each other and to use this
information to assure that each worker is attaining the goals of the work group”
(1995: 582).
Although agency theory suggests monitoring will lead to attainment of the goals of the
gainsharing program, it says nothing about how his happens or the way in which monitoring
affects individual work behavior.
Research that applies agency theory to the study of executive compensation suggests a
potential downside to monitoring.  Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) agree that group-based
incentives will result in enhanced monitoring, however, they also say that employees might
prefer monitoring to “working”.  This suggests that monitoring might result in employees
spending their time on monitoring activities at the expense of doing their own jobs, thus peer
monitoring might result in lower levels of individual performance.  An additional negative
outcome is that employees may become too risk averse as a result of excess monitoring
arrangements (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  The increased risk aversion is thought to lead to
poor decision making, which can then negatively affect individual behavior.  In addition,
Abrahamson and Park (1994) conducted research that indicated executives sometimes
camouflage negative information in order to protect themselves.  The authors explain what they
call “concealment strategy” as deliberate actions on the part of executives to keep certain
information secret (Sutton & Callahan, 1987).
Reducing time in job-related behaviors, risk aversion, and concealment can be viewed
as specific cases of what has been termed “the behavioral cost of monitoring” (Welbourne,
1992).  This occurs when excess control and/or monitoring causes employees to conform to the
expectations of others, thus potentially reducing individual performance.  By conforming to goals
set by others, employees might not be taking advantage of the information that they attain
through information scanning and enhanced monitoring.  This behavioral cost of monitoring has
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been discussed in terms of excess monitoring by supervisors (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia,
1995), but it might also be present as a result of excess or inappropriate monitoring by peers.
Control in the hands of peers might result in negative as well as positive individual behavioral
outcomes.  As certain employees increase monitoring, others might feel compelled to spend
time in that activity, thus potentially decreasing job performance.  Monitoring might also result in
risk aversion or concealment in response to peer pressure that is targeted at attainment of
short-term bonuses.  All of these examples indicate that monitoring can have a downside and
result in lower levels of individual performance.
To date, this issue has not been explored in a gainsharing context, and agency theory
only leads to mixed predictions.  In fact, Baker et al., (1988), when discussing agency theory
applied to group incentives note that “we (economists) do not understand how these effects
translate into increased productivity” (606).  Monitoring positively affects productivity if employee
performance is improved, however, the relationship between monitoring and worker
performance has not been studied, and the theory provides mixed guidance in understanding
this relationship.  Therefore, the nature of this study is exploratory, and the research question
being asked is:
Research Question: In what direction does monitoring, both within and between teams,
affect individual behavior in a gainsharing context?
In order to explore the individual behavioral consequences of monitoring, an exploratory
study that includes measures of multiple components of work-based behavior was conducted.
The components of individual behavior were developed through a series of interviews with
managers in gainsharing plants, a review of the compensation literature, and an application of
identity theory.  Identity theory guided the overall conceptualization of behavior being
categorized within a number of roles that individuals occupy within their organizations (Burke,
1991; Stryker & Serpe, 1982; Thoits, 1992).  Earlier work on identity theory as applied to
gainsharing states that:
“Group incentives vary considerably, and they can be designed to tap a variety of salient
roles in the workplace.  An employee has a number of roles at work; the most distant
role could be considered that of an organizational member (such as being an ‘IBMer’).
The ‘job holder’ role might be perceived as the most personal role...  In addition to the
job holder role and organizational member roles, a number of additional roles can be
considered” (Welbourne & Cable, 1995: 715).
Given the exploratory nature of this research, five different work-related roles were
selected for study.  The roles studied were: job holder, career, entrepreneur, team member, and
organizational member.  Performance within each one of these roles is rewarded by some part
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of the compensation program at the firms being studied, and managers at the gainsharing firms
determined that these roles were important for their business units’ current and future success.
The job holder role refers to the basic tasks that are included in the job description.
Base pay and merit pay are primarily developed to reward job-specific skills and abilities. The
career role refers to the behaviors and activities that are expected to enhance one’s career.
Promotion opportunities, lateral transfers, and raises associated with new jobs are available for
those who take advantage of career development.  The entrepreneurial role is often encouraged
by gainsharing plans.  In many situations, gainsharing plans include formal suggestion systems
designed to encourage employees to come up with ideas for improvement and to pursue their
suggestions.  The team member role is encouraged by companies with gainsharing plans and
other group-based incentives.  It consists of helping others in a work team, doing things to
promote the team’s interests, and basically working toward the goals of the team.  The
organizational member role is comparable to citizenship behaviors in that it encompasses
behaviors that are for the good of the overall company, but not necessarily required as part of
the job.
By viewing performance as multidimensional and associated with the five above-
mentioned work related roles, the research can address the individual behavioral effects of
monitoring.  According to the agency theory literature, monitoring could have a positive or a
negative effect on any one of the five behaviors.  Thus, the study is exploratory in nature, and
the results will be used to refine agency theory predictions.
RESEARCH METHOD
Two companies that implemented gainsharing programs participated in this study.  The
first served as a pilot study, while the second functioned as follow-up research.  The first site is
a unionized manufacturing plant that had gainsharing in effect for approximately one year.  The
second site involved one company that had also implemented gainsharing approximately one
year prior to the time when data were collected.  This second site included incentive and control
groups.  This gainsharing plan at the second company is different from the program
implemented in the pilot study in that employees were asked to give up part of their base pay
(between 1% and 5%) to participate in the gainsharing plan.
Both sites had relatively low payout histories.  The second site had higher overall
payouts, but some of the money was used to cover the costs incurred by placing part of base
pay at risk, therefore, the net payout condition was fairly low.  Neither of the plans had formal
suggestion systems.  The gainsharing formulas were based on traditional gainsharing
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components (sales value of production and expenses), and they also included components for
safety, quality, and/or customer service.
Site 1: Sample characteristics and data collection
This plant is part of a large, established Fortune 500 firm.  The entire corporation,
including this plant, had been experiencing downsizing as a result of increased global
competition for their product.  The plant studied was at 50% capacity when the gainsharing plan
was implemented.  The plant employs about 1,000 employees, and it is a 24-hour operation.
A stratified, random sample was selected, and surveys were distributed in individual
meetings with small groups of employees.  A total of 90 employees participated in the study.  In
addition, the company provided demographic information (age, salary, job title, tenure) from the
personnel files on all employees who participated in the project.  The union worked with me to
obtain cooperation from employees, however, the union executive board did not support the use
of manager ratings of performance.  Therefore, in this sample only self report measures of
performance were obtained.  The average age at the plant was 47 years.  There were more
men than women, as evidenced by the mean on the sex variable (.16 with male coded as 0 and
female coded as 1).
Site 2: Sample characteristics and data collection
Two different sites from within a large, established organization were included in this
study.  The two sites do comparable work, however, one had a gainsharing plan and one did
not.  The jobs are primarily in sales, marketing, and creative, artistic-type work.  A total of 108
employees participated in the study; 60 were in the control group, and 48 were in the
gainsharing group.  The average person in this organization was 36 years old, with a higher
probability of being female than male and a monthly salary of approximately $4,066.  Surveys
were distributed to employees in meetings conducted by the human resource management
representative.  Employees then mailed the surveys directly to me at the University.  The
response rate for the control group was 77%, and the response rate for the incentive group was
68%.
Independent Variables
Two measures of monitoring were used.  The first, mutual monitoring within work teams,
was based on earlier research (Welbourne, et al., 1995).  A total of five items were included,
and  the alpha coefficient for this scale was .73 at site 1 and .74 at site 2.  The monitoring
between group items were written to parallel those in the within team scale.  A total of four items
were utilized, and the alpha coefficient for site 1 was .87, while the coefficient for the second site
was .77.  The following items were used:  (1) If we can help out another work group, people in
Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under Gainsharing WP 95-31
Page 9
my work group will do it, (2) People in my work group think it’s important to spend time
understanding what other work groups do, (3) Everyone in my work group takes time to work
with people from other groups, and (4) Sharing information between groups is an important part
of our work.  The response format was a 1 to 5 Likert-type scale with 1 = Strongly disagree and
5 = Strongly agree.
Dependent Variables
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variables were designed based on three sources:
compensation research, interviews with managers at gainsharing plants, and identity theory
concepts.  Because this research was exploratory, I wanted to define multiple behavioral
outcomes.  With the assistance of a number of managers, we determined that work behaviors
could be categorized within five work-related roles (job holder, career, entrepreneur, team
member, and organization member).  Those roles are consistent with the types of pay and
rewards programs that most companies, and in particular those participating in the study, utilize.
Four items for each of the work roles were utilized in the pilot study.  The response
format was a 5-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = Needs much improvement, 2 = Needs some
improvement, 3 = Satisfactory, 4 = Good, and 5 = Excellent.  It was important to keep the
overall scale as short as possible and easy to complete in order to guarantee cooperation from
the managers.  I was able to collect a small number of managerial ratings of performance for the
pilot study, however, the data were only available for non-union employees, making the data
inappropriate for this particular analysis.  However, it was used for refinement of the survey for
site 2.  The second study utilized both manager evaluations of employee performance and self
ratings of performance.  Data on the five factors of performance have been collected in
additional firms (non-gainsharing sites), and the overall factor structure and resulting reliabilities
are stable at each company and related to other measures of performance (Welbourne,
Johnson & Erez, 1995).  The factor analysis at site 1 indicated a five factor solution as
appropriate (see Table 1).   Only three items loaded in an unpredictable manner (items #12, 16,
and 20), and the reliability analysis indicated that the items could be used in the intended
grouping.
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TABLE 1: FACTOR ANALYSIS - SITE 1, SELF RATINGS OF PERFORMANCE
FACTOR LOADINGS
              ITEMS                                                 1        2          3          4          5
Entrepreneur: Alpha coefficient = .90
1.   Coming up with new ideas. .88 -.06 .18 .15 .08
2.   Finding improved ways to do things. .82 .09 .25 .04 .13
3.   Working to implement new ideas. .78 .04 .39 .18 .05
4.   Creating better processes and routines. .77 -.12 .06 .34 .18
Career: Alpha coefficient = .88
5.   Seeking out career opportunities. .05 .90 .14 -.11 -.10
6.   Obtaining personal career goals. -.13 .87 .16 .20 -.02
7.   Developing skills needed for my future career..10 .83 .04 .08 .14
8.   Making progress in my career. .17 .78 .16 .28 -.06
Team: Alpha coefficient = .87
9.   Responding to the needs of others in my work.20 .14 .80 .17 .36
       group.
10. Seeking information from others in my work.28 .27 .76 .13 .12
       group.
11. Making sure my work group succeeds. .12 .25 .70 .41 .14
12. Working as part of a team or work group. .39 .27 .41 .15 .36
Organization: Alpha coefficient = .87
13. Doing things to promote the company. .17 .27 .15 .87 .16
14. Working for the overall good of the company..22 .22 .31 .80 .15
15. Helping out so that the company is a good.24 -.02 .25 .78 .28
       place to be.
16. Doing things that help others when it’s not.28 .01 .80 .19 .23
       part of my job.
Job: Alpha coefficient = .76
17. Quantity of work output. .07 .07 .04 .32 .80
18. Quality of work output. .13 -.04 .34 .09 .85
19. Accuracy of work. .20 -.09 .29 .11 .83
20. Customer service provided (internal and
      external customers). .57 -.13 .06 .33 .18
EIGENVALUES: Factor 1 = 8.05
  Factor 2 = 2.99
  Factor 3 = 1.94
  Factor 4 = 1.38
  Factor 5 = 1.08
A factor analysis was also run with the data from site 2.  The factor analysis was
conducted separately for the manager reports of performance and the self reports of
performance.  The results from the manager reports indicate a four factor solution, where both
team and organization member roles loaded on the same factor (See table 2).  However, the
reliability coefficients for the five-factor solution were all acceptable.  The self ratings of
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performance resulted in a five factor solution consistent with that found in the pilot study (See
table 3).  The reliability coefficients for all five factors were also acceptable.
TABLE 2: FACTOR ANALYSIS - SITE 2, MANAGER EVALUATIONS OF
PERFORMANCE
FACTOR LOADINGS
              ITEMS                                                        1          2          3          4    
Entrepreneur: Alpha coefficient = .88
1.   Coming up with new ideas. .12 .33 .79 .12
2.   Finding improved ways to do things. .40 .29 .68 .24
3.   Working to implement new ideas. .32 .33 .70 .20
4.   Creating better processes and routines. .42 .25 .49 .33
Career: Alpha coefficient = .89
5.   Seeking out career opportunities. .04 .84 .21 .02
6.   Obtaining personal career goals. .30 .84 .07 -.01
7.   Developing skills needed for his/her future career..25 .70 .32 .14
8.   Making progress in his/her career. .13 .86 .17 .20
Team: Alpha coefficient = .91
9.   Responding to the needs of others in my work group..84 .13 .10 .09
10. Seeking information from others in my work group..81 .22 .06 .13
11. Making sure my work group succeeds. .80 .18 .29 .29
12. Working as part of a team or work group. .78 .28 .08 .23
Organization: Alpha coefficient = .86
13. Doing things to promote the company. .71 -.01 .32 .04
14. Working for the overall good of the company. .67 .01 .55 .02
15. Helping out so that the company is a good place to be..70 .112 .41 -.04
16. Doing things that help others when it’s not part of.66 .08 .34 .22
       his/her job.
Job: Alpha coefficient = .75
17. Quantity of work output. .31 .04 .44 .63
18. Quality of work output. .12 .47 .28 .63
19. Accuracy of work.             .15 .04 .04 .91
20. Customer service provided (internal and external .71 .25 .08 .24
       customers).
EIGENVALUES:  Factor 1 = 9.46
  Factor 2 = 2.37
  Factor 3 = 1.47
  Factor 4 = 1.13
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TABLE 3: FACTOR ANALYSIS - SITE 2, SELF EVALUATIONS OF
PERFORMANCE
FACTOR LOADINGS
              ITEMS                                                 1        2          3          4          5
Entrepreneur: Alpha coefficient = .90
1.   Coming up with new ideas. .00 .84 .07 .01 .06
2.   Finding improved ways to do things. .18 .87 .12 .11 .13
3.   Working to implement new ideas. .32 .70 .33 .08 .09
4.   Creating better processes and routines. .20 .82 .08 .04 .07
Career: Alpha coefficient = .88
5.   Seeking out career opportunities.             .03 .06 .85 .09 .09
6.   Obtaining personal career goals. .11 .14 .83 -.11 .15
7.   Developing skills needed for my future career.-.09 .15 .65 .03 .21
8.   Making progress in my career. .06 .10 .81 .18 -.03
Team: Alpha coefficient = .87
9.   Responding to the needs of others in my work.66 .07 -.08 .44 .03
       group.
10. Seeking information from others in my work.82 .25 .02 .19 -.02
       group.
11. Making sure my work group succeeds. .79 .28 .09 .24 .09
12. Working as part of a team or work group. .76 .18 .16 .00 -.09
Organization: Alpha coefficient = .87
13. Doing things to promote the company. .18 .13 .12 .85 .06
14. Working for the overall good of the company..34 -.04 .09 .71 .11
15. Helping out so that the company is a good.16 .07 .05 .88 .07
       place to be.
16. Doing things that help others when it’s not.56 .02 -.20 .37 .10
       part of my job.
Job: Alpha coefficient = .76
17. Quantity of work output. .19 .24 .02 -.05 .68
18. Quality of work output. .10 .01 .29 .06 .79
19. Accuracy of work.             .15 .07 .09 .23 .69
20. Customer service provided (internal and .53 -.04 .07 .08 .37
       external customers).
  
EIGENVALUES:  Factor 1 = 5.76
  Factor 2 = 2.95
  Factor 3 = 2.07
  Factor 4 = 1.45
  Factor 5 = 1.29
Control Variables
Several control variables, which have been linked to performance in prior compensation
and gainsharing studies, were included in the analysis (Hatcher, Ross & Collins, 1989; Miceli &
Lane, 1991).  These are: age, gender, education, and salary.
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RESULTS
The results will be presented for site 1 and then for site 2.  The results of the survey at
site one were communicated to employees, management, and union representatives in focus
groups, and the results from those meetings will also be discussed to expand upon the
consequences of peer monitoring, in particular, on safety at the plant.  Results for the second
site will include separate analyses with the manager ratings of performance and the individual
ratings of performance as dependent variables.
Site 1 Results
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for all variables.
It is interesting to note that there was variance in the self report measures of performance.
Overall, employees rated their performance within the career role as lower than their
performance in the other roles.  The highest rating went to their performance in the job.  The
results also indicate that both monitoring variables (within and between groups) are related to
many of the performance dimensions, and they are all in a positive direction.
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TABLE 4: MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS FOR SITE 1, N=90
CORRELATIONS
Mean Standard
Deviation
Age Education Gender Salary Monitor
WT
Monitor
BT
Self
Career
Self
Entrepreneur
Self
Job
Self
Organization
Self
Team
Age 47.00 7.80 1.00 -.37*** .00 -.10 .13 .09 .09 -.01 -.14 .07 .09
Education 3.44 1.70 -.37*** 1.00 .28** .45*** -.01 .16 -.11 .25** .25** .20* .20*
Gender 0.16 0.37 .00 .27** 1.00 .22* .02 .11 -.03 .13 .04 .15 .14
Salary (per month) 2990.00 1106.00 -.01 .45*** .22* 1.00 -.02 .21* .00 .30** .37*** .54*** .34***
Monitor Within
Teams (WT)1
4.04 0.70 .13 -.01 .02 -.02 1.00 .24* .12 .18* .30** .22** .33**
Monitor Between
Teams (BT)1
3.01 0.97 .09 -.16 .11 .21 .24* 1.00 .27** .41*** .15 .50*** .44***
Self Career 2.83 0.81 .09 -.11 -.03 .00 .12 .27** 1.00 .20 .01 .31** .40***
Self Entrepreneur 3.46 0.79 -.01 .24** .13 .30** .18* .41*** .20* 1.00 .35*** .51*** .56***
Self Job 4.08 0.50 -.14 .25** .04 .37*** .30**  .15 .01 .35*** 1.00 .53*** .51***
Self Organization 3.47 0.83 .07 .20* .15 .54*** .22* .50*** .31** .51*** .53*** 1.00 .69***
Self Team 3.60 0.68 .09 .20* .14 .34*** .33** .44*** .40*** .56*** .51*** .69*** 1.00
* = P < .05
** = P < .01
*** = P < .001
1 = WT=Within Teams; BT=Between Teams
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Table 5 presents the results of a regression analysis that includes the control variables
and the two monitoring variables.  The overall regression equation is significant for four of the
five categories of performance (all but the career dimension).  Monitoring within teams is
significant in predicting job and team member performance.  Monitoring between teams is
significant in predicting career, entrepreneurial, organizational member, and team member
performance.  All beta coefficients are in a positive direction, suggesting that monitoring is
positively, rather than negatively, related to behavior.  The only significant control variable is
salary, and it is significant in predicting job, organizational member, and team member
performance.
TABLE 5: REGRESSION ANALYSES - SITE 1
Self Ratings of Performance
Career Entrepreneur Job Organization Team
Age -.01 .01  -.12 .04  .07
Education -.16  .11 .08  -.07 .05
Gender    -.02  .02  -.07 .01  .03
Salary  .02 .17 .34** .50*** .26*
Monitor
(WT)1
.05   .10   .32** .14  .25*
Monitor
(BT)1
.29* .33**  .00 .37*** .30**
R2    .10  .24 .26 .48  .32
F 1.29 3.62** 3.99*** 10.69*** 5.34***
Standardized betas reported.
* p <  .05 1=WT=Within Teams; BT=Between Teams.
** p <  .01
*** p <  .001
The results of the study were presented to employees, managers, and union
representatives in small focus groups.  All groups indicated that higher levels of monitoring were
occurring in the plant.  However, when I asked about the results of that enhanced monitoring,
their responses were mixed.  One goal of the gainsharing plan is to increase safety, and data
from the company clearly show that reported accidents have decreased dramatically.  However,
employees indicated that reported accidents have decreased, not necessarily total number of
accidents.  There were multiple comments (from management, union representatives, and
employees) that minor, and even some serious, accidents were not being reported due to peer
pressure.  At the same time, however, employees said that peer pressure was causing them to
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work in a safer manner.  Workers encourage each other to wear hard hats, take precautions,
and use safety procedures; this, I was told, did not happen prior to the gainsharing plan.
The safety committee conducted a survey of employees approximately two months prior
to the focus groups, and the results of its survey are consistent with employee comments.  A
total of 86% of respondents said they agreed with the following statement:  “I believe that
recognizing employees for positive safety performance promotes increased awareness,
watching out for yourself and others, and following the “brother’s keeper” philosophy.”  At the
same time, 68% said that the policy was causing employees to leave accidents unreported.  A
total of 87% said first-aid accidents were not being reported, while 10% thought that serious
accidents were not reported, and 3% thought disabling accidents were not reported.  During the
focus groups, I heard comments that employees who were hurt on the job avoided going to the
company medical officer by waiting to see a physician in town.  In addition, many employees
who did see the medical officers for treatment claimed that the injury occurred at home.
Site 2 Results
Means and standard deviations for the overall sample, the control group, and the
incentive group are included in Table 6.  The same pattern that existed at site 1 is found at site
2 in terms of performance rankings.  Both employees and managers rated their performance in
the job role highest, while they rated their performance within the career role as lowest.
Correlations for the entire sample are listed in Table 7.   It is interesting to note the correlations
between manager and self ratings of performance.  The only significant correlation (.25) is for
the entrepreneurial role.
Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under Gainsharing WP 95-31
Page 17
TABLE 6: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS, SITE 2, N=108
Overall Sample Control Incentives
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Age 36 8.17 35.97 8.67 35.96 7.67
Education 6.82 2   6.93 1.87   6.67 2.17
Incentive Condition
(0=control, 1=incentive)
  .46 .52 - - - -
Gender
(0=male,  1= female)
  .64 .48    .61 .49   .67  .47
Salary (monthly) 4066 3214  4382 4003  3706 1900
Monitor (WT)1  3.68 .59   3.85 .54   3.47 .6
Monitor (BT)1 3.5 .71   3.29 .74   3.75   .58
Manager 2 Career 3.4 .7   3.33 .61   3.42   .82
Manager Entrepreneur   3.51 .76   3.75 .51   3.21   .89
Manager Job   4.02 .64 4.1 .53   3.93   .87
Manager Organization   3.88 .68   4.06 .59   3.69   .72
Manager Team 3.9 .78   4.12 .63   3.86   .88
Self 3 Career   2.93 .77   2.94 .77 2.9   .77
Self Entrepreneur   3.76 .73   3.75 .76   3.76   .71
Self Job   4.28 .48   4.26 .53   4.29 .4
Self Organization   3.85 .69   3.89 .73   3.78   .62
Self Team   4.04 .65   3.93 .68   4.17   .57
p  < .05
p < .01
p < .001
1=WT=Within Teams; BT=Between Teams
2=Manager ratings of performance.  3=Self ratings of performance.
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TABLE 7: CORRELATIONS FOR SITE 2, N=108
Age Educ Incent
.
(0/1)
Gend
er
Salary Monit
or
Monit
or
Group
Manag
er
Career
Mana
ger
Entrep
Mana
ger
Job
Mana
ger
Org
Mana
ger
Team
Self
Career
Self
Entrep
Self
Job
Self
Org
Self
Team
Age 1.00 -.26** .01 -.01 .01 -.14 -.07 -.28* -.22* -.11 -.03 -.08 -.17* -.14 -.04 .05 -.08
Education -.26** 1.00 -.06 -.35*** .28** .11 .13 .11 .15 -.12 -.07 -.00 .18* .10 -.12 -.26** -.05
Incentive (0/1) .01 -.06 1.00 .08 -.11 -.29*** .34*** .08 -.30* -.07 -.20* -.13 .01 .02 .06 -.03 .22**
Gender -.01 -.35*** .08 1.00 -.17* .11 .11 .18 -.05 .08 .04 .04 -.04 .07 .06 .36*** .37***
Salary .01 .28** -.11 -.17* 1.00 .09 -.04 .11 .11 .12 .05 .03 .19* -.02 -.12 -.13 -.04
Monitor Within
Teams
-.14 .11 -.30*** .10 .09 1.00 .11 .15 .22* .16 .19* .17 .08 .12 .17* .25** .13
Monitor
Between
Teams
-.07 .13 .34*** .11 -.04 .11 1.00 .14 .15 .19* .28** .25* .07 .21* .18* .15 .47***
Manager
Career
-.28** .11 .08 .18 .11 .15 .14 1.00 .58*** .49*** .37** .44*** -.02 .12 -.01 .06 .22*
Manager
Entrepreneur
-.22* .15 -.30*** -.05 .11 .22* .15 .58*** 1.00 .65*** .64*** .60*** -.18 .25* -.08 -.17 .10
Manager
Job
-.11 -.12 -.07 .08 .12 .16 .19 .49*** .65*** 1.00 .62* .62*** -.15 .11 .02 -.01 .14
Manager
Organization
-.03 -.07 -.20* .04 .05 .19* .28** .37*** .64*** .62*** 1.00 .77*** -.17 -.04 -.14 -.02 .06
Manager
Team
-.08 -.00 -.13 .04 .03 .17 .25** .44*** .60*** .62*** .77*** 1.00 -.24* .15 -.21* .09  .18
Self Career -.17* .18* .01 -.04 .19* .08 .07 -.02 -.18 -.15 -.17 -.24 1.00 .29*** .31*** .11 .14
Self
Entrepreneur
-.14 .10 .02 .07 -.02 .12 .21* .12 .25* .11 -.04 .15 .29*** 1.00 .28** .20* .40***
Self Job -.04 -.12 .06 .06 -.12 .17* .18* -.01 -.08 .02 -.14 -.21* .31*** .28** 1.00 .31*** .27***
Self
Organization
.05 -.26** -.03 .36*** -.13 .25** .15 .06 -.17 -.01 -.01 .09 .11 .20* .31*** 1.00 .56***
Self Team -.08 -.05 .22* .37*** -.04 .13 .47*** .22* .10 .14 .06 .18 .14 .40*** .27** .56*** 1.00
p  < .05       p < .01        p < .001
Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under Gainsharing WP 95-31
Page 19
An ANOVA was run to determine if the levels of monitoring differed between the control
and incentive groups.  The results are significant for both monitoring variables.  The mean for
the monitoring within teams variable is 3.85 for the control group and 3.47 for the incentive
group, with an F of 6.46, which is significant at the .01 level.  The mean for the monitoring
between teams variable for the control group is 3.29, and the mean for the incentive group is
3.75.  The F was 7.31, which is significant at the .001 level.  It is interesting to note that
monitoring within teams is higher in the control group, but monitoring between teams is higher in
the incentive group.
The regression analysis for self ratings of performance is included in Table 8.   The
analysis for manager ratings of performance is included in Table 9.  Being in the incentive
condition did not predict any individual behaviors for the self ratings, but it did have a significant
and negative effect on the manager ratings of performance.  These results indicate that being in
the control condition (coded as 0) resulted in higher levels of performance in the entrepreneurial
and organization member dimensions of performance.  Monitoring within teams is positively
related to organizational member behaviors and only in the self report analysis.  Monitoring
between groups is related to self ratings of team member performance, while it is related to
managerial ratings of entrepreneurial, job, organization member, and team member
performance.
TABLE 8: REGRESSION ANALYSES - SITE 2
Self Ratings of Performance
Career Entrepreneur Job Organization Team
Age  -.14  -.09  -.05  .05 -.04
Education   .09   .06  -.17 -.18 -.01
Incentive
(0/1)
  .03  -.03   .04 -.05  .08
Gender   .01   .06  -.05   .25**   .32***
Salary   .16  -.02  -.09 -.06  .04
Monitor
(WT)1
  .03   .06   .19  .22* .07
Monitor
(BT)1
  .04   .19   .16 .14   .39***
R2   .08   .07     .09 .23   .33
F 1.22 1.09 1.48 4.27*** 7.08***
* p <  .05
** p <  .01
*** p <  .001
1WT=Within Teams; BT=Between Teams
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TABLE 9: REGRESSION ANALYSES - SITE 2
Manager Ratings of Performance
Career Entrepreneur Job Organization Team
Age -.25* -.19 -.15 -.04 -.08
Education .07 .01 -.26* -.19 -.10
Incentive
(0/1)
.09 -.35** -.12  -.33* -.23
Gender .19  -.04 -.01 -.04 -.02
Salary .13 .07  .19 .07 .04
Monitor
(WT)1
.09 .06 .08 .07 .06
Monitor
(BT)1
.06  .25*  .25* .41** .33*
R2 .15 .21 .14 .21 .13
F 1.66 2.38*  1.48 2.33* 1.39
* p <  .05
** p <  .01
*** p <  .001
1WT=Within Teams; BT=Between Teams.
The incentive condition itself seems to be having a negative impact on certain aspects of
performance at this site (at least from the manager’s perspective).  However, monitoring
behaviors, when significant, have only a positive impact on performance.  Therefore, even
though there might be something about the gainsharing plan that decreases performance within
the incentive condition, the enhanced levels of monitoring might be compensating for that
decreased performance.
DISCUSSION
The results from site 2 are rather perplexing because the incentive condition itself seems
to be negatively related to performance.  Two explanations are possible.  The first is related to
the fact that employees placed part of their base pay at risk.  This site is a financially healthy
company, and conversations with management indicate that employees might not have
responded well to the gainsharing plan because they did not understand the necessity of
placing part of base pay at risk.  The overall negative attitude toward the gainsharing plan might
have resulted in some retaliatory behaviors that are evidenced as lower performance.  A second
explanation is based on agency theory.  The negative impact on entrepreneurial and
organizational facets of performance might reflect the fact that employees in the incentive
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condition became more risk averse in response to either peer monitoring or simply because part
of their base pay was placed at risk.
In order to test this risk aversion hypothesis, two analyses were run.  First, an ANOVA
run at site 2 comparing risk aversion1 n the incentive and control conditions found that the
mean for the control group was 2.51, while the mean for the incentive group was 2.21
(significant at the .05 level, F=3.29).  This seems to cast doubt on the risk taking explanation
because the incentive group is more risk taking than the control group.  In order to further test
the notion that monitoring can lead to risk averse behaviors (which was specifically mentioned
by researchers using agency theory), I examined the effect of monitoring (both within and
between teams) on suggestion making behaviors at both sites.  Two scales were developed,
one which is defined as suggestion making when high risks are present, and a second that
reflected suggestion making under low risk conditions (both were self report items, See Table
10).  A regression analysis was run to determine if monitoring or the gainsharing condition
affected either form of suggestion making activity and in what direction they might predict.  The
regression equations, tested at both companies, showed that monitoring had either an
insignificant or positive effect on suggestion making activities, and the gainsharing condition had
no effect for both the high and low risk suggestion making conditions.
                                         
1 Risk aversion was measured with three items (1) I am not willing to take risks when choosing a job or company to work for.  (2)
I am a cautious person who generally avoids risk.  (3) I always play it safe, even if it means occasionally losing out on a good
opportunity.  The alpha coefficient at site 1 was .79, and at site 2 it was .64.  These items were adapted from a risk aversion
scale used by Cable and Judge, 1994.
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TABLE 10: REGRESSION ANALYSIS WITH SUGGESTION ACTIVITY
Suggestion Activity Suggestion Activity
High Risk                                Low Risk
Site 1                Site 2                Site 1                Site 2
Gender .06 -.02 -.02 .09
Incentive condition
   (0=control; 1=gainsharing)    .08 .10
Salary .01 .08 .01 .12
Age -.02 .09 -.01 .04
Education .22 .24* .18 .05
Monitoring within teams .22* .01 .21* .08
Monitoring between teams .37*** .10 .45*** .32**
R2  .31 .10 .35 .42
F 5.22*** 1.54 6.30*** 3.06**
(Standardized beta coefficients are reported.)
Suggestion activity - high risk (1 to 5 scale, agree/disagree format)
1. I am willing to pursue a new idea even if it’s unpopular.
2. I will pursue new ideas even if it makes me look silly to others.
3. I am someone who will go out on a limb to pursue a new idea.
Coefficient alpha at site 1 = .89; alpha at site 2 = .60
Suggestion activity - low risk
1. I think of new ideas and implement them on the job.
2. If I see something that needs to be changed, I let the right people know.
3. I often come up with new ways to do my job.
4. When I think of new ways to do my job, I tell my supervisor about them.
Coefficient alpha at site 1 = .79; alpha at site 2 = .77
An alternative explanation for the site 2 gainsharing effect is that employees determined
entrepreneurial and organizational behaviors were things that the company “wanted” but that
the employees did not think were “necessary” to obtain the bonus.  Although data to support this
explanation were not available, management at the firm seems to think that this interpretation is
an accurate depiction.  Employees are doing what they must do, but no more.  Of course, this
finding only occurs when the managerial ratings of performance are used in the analysis.  The
incentive condition did not affect self report measures of performance, so the negative
behavioral results in the incentive condition might also be related to management issues
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(experience, management - employee relations, quality of performance ratings, communication,
etc.) rather than the gainsharing plan.
The overall results show that monitoring has either zero or positive impact on the five
categories of individual employee behavior.  All of the quantitative data suggest that when
monitoring affects individual performance, it does so in a positive direction.  It is also interesting
to note that monitoring between teams has a greater impact on individual performance than
does monitoring within teams.  This seems consistent with agency theory concepts in that
monitoring between groups increases the amount of information any individual or work team
has, thus potentially increasing performance.
Although monitoring leads to positive behavioral outcomes, the data from both sites
suggest that caution must be taken in the design of gainsharing-type incentives.  Peers seem to
be well equipped to monitor each other in order to obtain the goals of the gainsharing plan, and
it is important that management understands the implications of the goals that they set in their
bonus plans.  Site 1 found that peers were monitoring each other to reduce reported accidents,
but they were doing so in ways that the company did not condone.  They were not reporting
accidents that did occur.  The results at site 2 showed that employees were working toward the
goals important for the bonus, but they might also be minimizing or even reducing efforts in
other areas that are perceived as not directly affecting the gainsharing bonus.  This study
provides additional support for the creative genius of employees working under incentive
programs.  In the days of piece rate systems, we learned that employees could alter their work
habits when the timekeeper arrived.  The same phenomenon seems to exist when gainsharing
plans are used.  This does not imply that these programs are leading to lower performance; in
fact, this study found that monitoring is associated with higher individual levels of performance.
However, the results do indicate that it is critical for managers to understand the ways in which
employees are translating the goals of the gainsharing plan into behaviors.
The findings of this study also have implications for the use of team-bas d incentives,
which are increasingly becoming popular.  If team-based incentives (rather than gainsharing-
type programs) are used, employees might not benefit from the between team information
scanning activity (monitoring) that occurs when gainsharing programs are implemented.  Given
the complexity in developing objective measures of team performance and the potential for
competition between teams, the results of this research suggest that plant, division, or business
unit incentive schemes might be more appropriate for maximizing individual worker
performance.
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Overall, the results of this study imply that monitoring activities, under gainsharing,
produce positive results on individual behavior.  Given the fact that the gainsharing plan at site 2
resulted in some negative behavioral consequences, it is encouraging to see that, despite those
problems, monitoring seemed to have positive effects on the individual behaviors studied.  This
research expands agency theory by finding that monitoring has either zero or positive effects on
individual work-related behaviors.  However, it also confirms that the process by which that
performance is achieved needs further elaboration.
Monitoring seems to result in positive individual behaviors in the short run, and hereby
enhance performance, but the process by which that performance is achieved may have serious
implications for the long-run performance of the firm.  For example, if minor accidents continue
to go unreported at site 1, and if as a result, workers are not receiving medical treatment at an
early stage, minor incidents might transform into major problems.  This not only jeopardizes the
individual, but it also threatens the safety of others in the plant.  This study indicates that the
process, not only the outcomes, of gainsharing needs to be fully understood.  It also has
implications for training and development activities in a gainsharing environment; workers need
to be educated about not only the goals of the gainsharing plan but the means by which those
goals should be attained.  In addition, management should fully understand the effects of peer
monitoring on the process by which employees obtain their personal and division-level
objectives.
Of course, this study is limited because all of the data were collected at one point in
time, thus reverse causality cannot be ruled out.  Future research should be designed to study
the effect of monitoring on individual behaviors with longitudinal data.  In addition, a combination
of qualitative and quantitative data, such as that used in this research, should continue to be
collected.  This will help elaborate upon the process issues, which are more complex, and
perhaps as or more important than the short-term outcomes.  Additional measures of
performance (other than self and manager report) to substantiate the findings for each of the
behavioral categories would also be useful to expand the results of this study.
Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under Gainsharing WP 95-31
Page 25
REFERENCES
Abrahamson, E. & Park, C.  1994.  Concealment of negative organizational outcomes: An
agency theory perspective.  Academy of Management Journal, 37(5): 1302-1334.
Alchian, A. A. & Demsetz, H., 1972.  Production, information costs, and economic organization.
American Economic Review, 62: 777-795.
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C. & Murphy, D. J.  1988.  Compensation and incentives: Practice vs.
theory.  The Journal of Finance, 18(3), 593-616
Burke, P. J.  1991.  Identity process and social stress.  American Sociological Review, 56: 836-
849.
Cable, D.M. & Judge, T.A.  1994.  Pay preferences and job search decisions: A person-
organization fit perspective.  P rsonnel Psychology, 47, 317-348.
Eisenhardt, K. M.  1985.  Organizational control: Organizational and economic approaches.
Management Science, 31: 134-149.
Fama, E. F.  1980.  Agency problems and the theory of the firm.  Jou nal of Political Economy,
88: 288-307.
Fama, E. F.  & Jensen, M. L.  1983.  Separation of ownership and control.  Jou nal of Law and
Economics, 26: 301-325.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R.  1994.  Executive compensation: A reassessment and a future research
agenda.  Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, 12: 161-222.  JAI
Press.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R.  & Balkin, D. B. 1992.  Compensation, organizational strategy, and firm
performance.  Cincinnati, OH: South Western Publishing Co.
Graham-Moore, B. E.  & Ross, T. L. 1990.  Gainsharing: Plans for improving performance.
Washington, D.C: The Bureau of National Affairs.
Gerhart, B.  & Milkovich, G. T.  1993.  Employee compensation: Research and practice.  In M.
D. Dunnette & L. M. Hough (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, Vol. 3, Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc.
Hatcher, L., Ross, T.L. & Collins, B.  1989.  Prosocial behavior, job complexity, and suggestion
contribution under gainsharing plans.  Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 25(3), 231-
248.
Iberman, W.  1993.  Gaining performance, sharing productivity.  Manufacturing Systems, 11(4):
54-56.
Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H.  1976.  Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs,
and ownership structure.  Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
Individual Consequences of Monitoring Under Gainsharing WP 95-31
Page 26
Lawler, E. E., III. & Cohen, S. G.  1992.  Designing a pay system for teams.  American
Compensation Association Journal, 1(1): 6-19.
Markham, S. E., Scott, D. D. & Little, B. L.  1992.  National gainsharing study: The importance of
industry differences.  Compensation and Benefits Review, 24(1): 34-35.
Miceli, M. P. & Lane, M. C.  1991.  Antecedents of pay satisfaction: A review and extension.
Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, 9: 235-309.
Stryker, S. & Serpe, R. T.  1982.  Commitment, identity, salience, and role behavior.  In W.
Ickes and E. S. Knowles (Eds.), Personality, roles, and social behavior.  New York:
Springer-Verlag, 199-218.
Sutton, R. & Callahan, A. 1987.  The stigma of bankruptcy.  Academy of Management Journal,
30: 405-436.
Thoits, P. A.  1992.  Identity structures and psychological well being: Gender and marital status
comparisons.  Social Psychology Quarterly, 55: 236-256.
Welbourne, T. M.  1992.  The effect of gainsharing on employee behavior: Test of a theoretical
model derived through agency theory and procedural justice perspectives.  Doctoral
dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder.
Welbourne, T. M.  & Cable, D. M.  1995.  Group incentives and pay satisfaction: Understanding
the relationship through an identity theory perspective.  Human Relations, 48(6), 711-
726.
Welbourne, T.M. Balkin, D. B.  & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.  1995.  Gainsharing and mutual
monitoring: A combined agency-organizational justice perspective.  Academy of
Management Journal, 38(3), 881-899.
Welbourne, T. M.  & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.  1995.  Gainsharing: A critical review and a future
research agenda.  Journal of Management, 21(3), 559-609.
Welbourne, T. M.  & Gomez-Mejia, L. R.  1988.  Gainsharing revisited.  Compensation and
Benefits Review, 20(4), 19-28.
Welbourne, T.M., Johnson, D., & Erez, A., 1995.  The five factor performance scale: Validity
analysis of a useful research tool.   Working paper, Center for Advanced Human
Resource Studies, Cornell University.
